We examined the efficacy of a new approach to detect truths and lies in expressing opinions: the Devil's 20 Advocate approach. Interviewees are first asked an opinion eliciting question that asks participants to argue 21 in favour of their personal view. This is followed by a Devil's Advocate question that asks participants to 22 argue against their personal view. People normally think more about reasons that support rather than 23 oppose their opinion. Therefore we expected truth tellers to provide more information and shorter latency 24 times in their responses to the opinion eliciting question than to the Devil's Advocate question. 
more than 50 CBCA studies, and found that several of these criteria 48 discriminated reasonably well between truths and lies. A review of 49 more than 20 RM studies showed a similar picture (Vrij, 2008) .
50
Several of the eight RM criteria discriminated reasonably well 51 between truths and lies. CBCA and RM were designed to distinguish 52 between truths and lies when people describe events that they claim American views on the internet. However, it was decided that the 77 views he had expressed were part of a good cover, and the possibility 78 that they were his real views was discounted (The Sunday Times, 10 79 January, 2010).
80
In order to detect truths and lies about opinions we designed the Reasons that support an opinion are likely to be more readily 136 available in someone's mind than reasons that oppose an opinion 137 (Fazio, 1990; Tesser, 1978 Table 2 ). should be considered liars. Table 3 shows the scores for each verbal 517 cue and the total perception scores for the seven truth tellers and 518 seven liars. The total perception score is presented in the last column.
490
519 Table 3 shows that the scores for truth tellers and liars differed questions (see Table 1 ). In addition, our analyses of latency times liars (see Table 3 ).
547
Observers' veracity assessments yielded a high truth accuracy rate
548
(77%) but a low lie accuracy rate (49% 1 The finding that observers found the liars more talkative when answering the opinion eliciting question than when answering the Devil's Advocate question does not replicate the findings of Experiment 1. In that experiment no significant difference was found in the number of words mentioned by liars when answering the Devil's Advocate question and the opinion eliciting question. Perhaps for the observers in Experiment 2, 'talkativeness' was not equal to the number of words used. With hindsight it is unfortunate that we did not give the observers in Experiment 2 more guidance about how we defined talkativeness.
realistic situation as a function of perceived support for that opinion. International
